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High-Tech Words Do Hurt: A Modern
Makeover Expands Missouri's Harassment
Law to Include Electronic Communications*
Missouri Revised Statute § 565.090'
I. INTRODUCTION
Megan Meier was 13 years old when she committed suicide on October
216, 2006. Afterwards, it came to light that she was the victim of "a cruel
cyber hoax" that began as a MySpace friendship with a 16 year-old boy
named Josh Evans.3 Soon after the two teenagers became friends, Josh began
insulting Megan in various ways.4 For instance, on October 15, 2006, Josh
sent a message saying "'I don't know if I want to be friends with you any
longer because I hear you're not nice to your friends."' 5 Megan's father
claimed that that he saw another message from Josh sent on October 16,
2006, that said "th[is] world would be better off without [you]." 6  That
evening, Megan committed suicide.
7
Six weeks after Megan's death, her family received the shocking news
that Josh Evans did not exist.8 Instead, they learned that "Josh Evans" was
the creation of a neighborhood mom, Lori Drew, who wanted to see if Megan
* Juris Doctor candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2009. Special
thanks to Professor Douglas Abrams for his guidance in writing this article. I am also
grateful to the entire staff of the Law Review for their assistance in preparation and
editing. All errors remain mine alone. My deepest gratitude goes to all of my friends
and family whom without, nothing would be possible. I dedicate this article to my
mother, Debra M. Henderson, whose love and support allows me to always dream
big, and to my father, Michael L. Henderson, who inspires me every day in the areas
of law and life.
1. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090 (Supp. 2008).
2. Parents: Cyber Bullying Led to Teen's Suicide, ABC NEWS, Nov. 19, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Story?id=3882520&page=l [hereinafter Parents].
3. Id. "MySpace is a free online community composed of personal profiles
aimed foremostly at a younger membership. A MySpace profile typically includes a
digital photo and in-depth information about personal interests." Wise Geek, What Is
MySpace?, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-myspace.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
2009).
4. Parents, supra note 2. Josh's profile began posting bulletins that everyone
could see that called Megan, inter alia, a "slut" and "fat." Id.
5. Id.
6. Mom: MySpace Hoax Led to Daughter's Suicide, Fox NEWS, Nov. 16, 2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,312018,00.html [hereinafter MySpace Hoax].
7. Parents, supra note 2.
8. Id,
1
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would say anything negative about Drew's daughter. 9 Despite Josh Evans'
deceitful actions, no state charges were brought against any individuals
involved in Megan's death.' 0 This is because the behavior that prompted
Megan to commit suicide was not a criminal act under Missouri law.
1
Sending harassing messages through electronic communications, such as the
ones that led to Megan's death, is called cyberbullying. Further, one
commentator recently coined suicide as a result of being bullied online as
"Bullycide."' 12  The Meier incident and others have put pressure on the
Missouri Legislature to make intemet harassment and cyberbullying a crime
by amending § 565.090 of the Missouri Revised Statues. 13
This Article will examine, inter alia, whether actions that qualify as
cyberbullying could be considered harassment when done in person. More
specifically, Part II of this Article will provide an explanation of
cyberbullying, discuss the application of Missouri harassment law before the
recent amendments, and detail relevant First Amendment issues as they
pertain to harassment statutes. Part III will review Missouri's recently
amended harassment statute, Missouri Revised Statute § 565.090. Further,
Part III will explore the effectiveness of current and pending federal statutes
that might prosecute cyberbullies. Part IV will discuss the likely issues that a
court must resolve in order to apply the revised statute. Lastly, this article
will argue that having an effective federal cyberbullying law is essential to
punishing and preventing harassment by electronic means.
9. Myspace Hoax, supra note 6. Later on, it came to light that several people
were involved in the hoax against Megan. Jonann Brady, Exclusive: Teen Talks
About Her Role in Web Hoax That Led to Suicide, ABC NEWS, Apr. 1, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Story?id=4560582&page=l. One article that discussed
whether laws should be passed to regulate cyberbullying nicely stated the
circumstances surrounding the MySpace hoax and are repeated as follows:
Other than the final message, who made specific statements to Megan as
"Josh Evans" is unclear at the time of this writing. Regardless of the
identity of the author of specific messages to Megan, the underlying
cyberbullying behavior remains intact in the combination of three possible
scenarios: (1) Lori Drew was an adult who victimized Megan, (2) Drew's
daughter was one of Megan's peers who victimized her, and/or (3) Ashley
Grills was an acquaintance of Megan who victimized her.
Matthew C. Ruedy, Comment, Repercussions of a MySpace Suicide: Should Anti-
Cyberbullying Laws be Created?, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 323, 325 n.17 (2008). To
preserve clarity, this Note will adopt the approach taken in the Ruedy comment, in
that "the statements made on the fake MySpace page... will be described as though
they were made by 'Josh Evans."' Id.
10. However, as discussed infra, she was eventually charged under federal
statutes. See infra text accompanying notes 122-24.
11. Parents, supra note 2.
12. BRENDA HIGH, BULLYCIDE IN AMERICA: MOMS SPEAK OUT ABOUT THE
BULLYING/SUtCIDE CONNECTION (2007).
13. See infra Part uI.A.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. What Is Cyberbullying?
Bullying is when someone takes repeated action in order to control
another person.' 4  With the widespread use of the Internet in the United
States, a new form of bullying has emerged called "cyberbullying."
15
"'Cyberbullying' is when a child, preteen or teen is tormented, threatened,
harassed, humiliated, embarrassed or otherwise targeted by another child,
preteen or teen using the Internet, interactive and digital technologies, or
mobile phones."' 6  While typical cases of cyberbullying focus on young
people, adults can also be involved in such behavior. In fact, Missouri law
prohibits both adults and uveniles from committing such acts, and punishes
the former more harshly.
People often confuse the terms cyberbullying and cyberstalking.
However, the two are different because "cyberstalking often includes credible
threats both online and offline, while cyberbullying usually does not."18 In
addition, cyberstalking is dealt with through stalking laws, 19 while
cyberbullying is covered in harassment laws.
14. Stop Bullying Now, So What is Bullying?, http://stopbullyingnow.hrsa.
gov/index.asp?area-whatbullyingis (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
15. Ruedy, supra note 9, at 329 (discussing the "frequency of cyberbullying
among middle school students").
16. Stop Cyberbullying, What Is Cyberbullying, Exactly?, http://www.stopcy
berbullying.org/what is cyberbullyingexactly.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
17. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090 (Supp. 2008) (stating that harassment is a
misdemeanor unless it is "[clommitted by a person twenty-one years of age or older
against a person seventeen years of age or younger," in which case it is a felony).
When a distinction is needed, the cyberbullying of a child by an adult will be called
"felony cyberbullying."
18. Ruedy, supra note 9, at 327.
19. Senate Bills 818 & 795 addressed this in addition to cyberbullying by
amending Missouri's stalking statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.225 (Supp. 2008), to
include all forms of communication. The relevant sections of this statute state:
1. As used in this section, the following terms shall mean:
(1) "Course of conduct", a pattern of conduct composed of two or
more acts, which may include communication by any means, over a
period of time... ;
(2) "Credible threat", a threat communicated with the intent to cause
the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or
her safety, or the safety of his or her family, or household members..
(3) "Harasses", to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person that serves no legitimate purpose, that would cause a
reasonable person under the circumstances to be frightened,
intimidated, or emotionally distressed.
3
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According to a recent study by the National Crime Prevention Council
(NCPC), forty-three percent of teens were victims of cyberbullying in the last
20year. Over eighty percent of teens claim that cyberbullying takes place
because the perpetrator finds humor in it. 2 1 Other reasons for cyberbullying
include friends pressuring each other to cyberbully and ignorance of the
"negative impact it may have on the victim." 22 Cyberbullies can be peers,
neighbors, or even anonymous individuals, 23 but most of the time the
perpetrators know their victims.
24
B. Harassment in Missouri Before Cyberbullying
Both Missouri and other states that have criminalized cyberbullying
have done so by amending existing harassment laws to include electronic
25
communications. Prior to this amendment, however, many cases permitted
Missouri courts to examine the harassment statute's validity. As such,
analyzing these harassment cases is necessary as they will demonstrate the
types of challenges that courts will face in the future when defendants argue
that the new language affects the settled validity of the statute.
2. A person commits the crime of stalking if he or she purposely, through
his or her course of conduct, harasses or follows with the intent of
harassing another person.
3. A person commits the crime of aggravated stalking if he or she
purposely, through his or her course of conduct, harasses or follows with
the intent of harassing another person, and:
(1) Makes a credible threat ....
Id. (emphasis added). While cyberstalking and cyberbullying have some similarities,
the scope of this law summary will be on cyberbullying and the law prohibiting it.
For an excellent analysis of how Missouri's stalking statute might be interpreted, see
generally Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the
Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 Mo. L. REv. 125, 175-77 (2007).
For an example of a neighboring state's criminalization of cyberstalking, see 720 ILL.
CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West 2003).
20. National Crime Prevention Council, Stop Cyberbullying Before It Starts 1,
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/by-audience/parents/bullying/cyberbullying/cyberbu
llying.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2009). An alarming addition to this statistic is that
thirty percent of those victims wanted to seek revenge against their cyberbully. Id. at
2.
21. Id. at 1.
22. Id.
23. National Crime Prevention Council, Cyberbullying, http://www.ncpc.org/
topics/by-audience/parents/bullying/cyberbullying/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
24. Id. When cyberbullies do remain anonymous, it "can add to a victim's
insecurity." Id.
25. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A- 11-8 (LexisNexis 1977), amended by ALA. CODE
§ 13A-1 1-8 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120(2002), amended by
ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120 (2006).
[Vol. 74
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As interpreted by Missouri courts, harassment includes the use of
"coarse language offensive to one of average sensibility." 26 Several elements
factor into determining harassment, including where the statement was made,
27
who made it, to whom it was made, and the speaker's intention. The
perpetrator's intention can be, and often is, proven by circumstantial
evidence.28 Further, intent to harass can be found when repeated contact is
made with the victim, regardless of whether the victim has asked the harasser
to cease contact. 29 The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld this principle in the
case of State v. Creech.30 In this case, the defendant made repeated calls to
the victim, inquiring about sex, after the victim rejected the defendant's
advances. 31  The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's
conviction for harassment, noting that the defendant's calls created "intent to
disturb. ' '32 In making this determination, the court noted that the defendant's
actions are judged as a whole, instead of only after he was told to stop.33
Similarly, in State v. Koetting the same court affirmed the defendant's
harassment conviction.34 Koetting made repeated threatening calls to the
victim's house, as many as twelve over a thirty-six day period. At one
point, Koetting even threatened to "knock [the victim's] head off."' 36 The
court found this behavior unacceptable because "[c]oarse language directed
specifically to an average person is likely to be offensive." 37 In addition, the
court noted that protecting a private recipient from unwanted communication
is a compelling government interest. The location of the calls was
important because the offensive character of the statements increases when in
the privacy of a person's home.
39
These cases give insight into factors a court might look at when
applying the amended harassment statute to cyberbullying. These factors
26. State v. Yeargain, 926 S.W.2d 883, 887 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996) (citing Mo.
REV. STAT. § 565.090 (1994), amended by Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090 (Supp. 2008)).
27. Id. at 888. Many of the interpretations of the Missouri harassment statute,
before it was recently amended, include actions by telephone and letter. E.g., State v.
Chavez, 165 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005).
28. Chavez, 165 S.W.3d at 549 (citing State v. Rafaeli, 905 S.W.2d 516, 518
(Mo. App. E.D. 1995)).
29. State v. Creech, 983 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) ("We do not
agree that the State needs to establish that the victim told the [harasser] to stop ...
(citing State v. Mallory, 886 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994))).
30. 983 S.W.2d 169.
31. Id. at 170.
32. Id. at 171.
33. See id.
34. 691 S.W.2d 328, 333 (Mo. App. E.D. 1985).
35. Id. at 330.
36. Id. at 330.
37. Id. at 331.
38. Id. (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970)).
39. Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
5
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include the intent of the perpetrator, the characteristics of the victim, and the
location of the communication. Also, a court might engage in a constitutional
analysis if the validity of the statute is challenged.
C. Constitutional Background
Any law that restricts speech, no matter how socially unacceptable that
speech is, must pass the protections of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.40  However, the First Amendment's free speech
protection has exceptions, most notably that the government may proscribe
some categories of expression as long as the restriction is consistent with the
Constitution.41 The following is a discussion of speech that may be regulated
and other free speech concerns implicated by criminalizing cyberbullying.
1. True Threats
Judicial interpretation of the First Amendment allows a state to
proscribe "true threats. ' '42  In Virginia v. Black, the United States Supreme
Court held that "true threats" include "those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.,
43
Because of the nature of "true threats," the Court held that they can be
proscribed because the government should be able to "[protect] individuals
from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from




Despite the holding in Black, the United States Supreme Court has failed
to provide exhaustive guidance on what constitutes a "true threat."
Nevertheless, the circuit courts have followed two predominant approaches in
evaluating whether a statement reaches such a level. 45 The first approach,
which has been adopted by the Eighth Circuit, is whether a reasonable
recipient would have interpreted the statement as a serious expression of
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ...abridging the
freedom of speech."); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) ("'If there
is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable."' (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989))).
41. Black, 538 U.S. at 358 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942)).
42. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
43. Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708).
44. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
45. See Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir.
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intent to harm or injure another.46 The second view is whether a reasonable
speaker would foresee that the target would interpret his or her statement(s)
as a serious expression of intent to harm or injure.47  Neither approach
requires that the speaker intend to carry out the threat or even that the speaker
is capable of carrying it out.48 However, for the speaker of the threat to be
punished under either approach, he or she must have intentionally or
knowingly communicated the statement in question to the object of the threat
or to a third party.49
2. Fighting Words and Offensive Speech
It is clear that cyberbullies offend, hurt, and depress their victims
through online communications. Yet, a speaker cannot be punished for
offending others when the speaker is merely trying to persuade others as to
his viewpoint. 50  However, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the United States
Supreme Court refused to protect persuasive speech, regardless of the
speaker's intent, when the speech "provoke[d] violence and disturb[ed] ...
good order." 51 Further, while the use of profanity or indecent and abusive
language is not determinative in finding "fighting words," this type of
language may add to the speech being labeled as such.52 Fighting words are
not protected by the First Amendment because "epithets or personal abuse is
not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded
by the Constitution."53 Therefore, because this speech is not protected by the
First Amendment, it can be abridged by laws.54 In addition, subsequent
rulings have provided factors for determining when speech constitutes
fighting words which include whether the statement is a provocative personal
46. Doe, 306 F.3d at 622. Factors that the court suggested in determining how a
reasonable recipient would view an alleged threat were:
1) the reaction of those who heard the alleged threat; 2) whether the threat
was conditional; 3) whether the person who made the alleged threat
communicated it directly to the object of the threat; 4) whether the speaker
had a history of making threats against the person purportedly threatened;
and 5) whether the recipient had a reason to believe that the speaker had a
propensity to engage in violence.
Id. at 623 (citing United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996)).
47. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996).
48. Doe, 306 F.3d at 625 n.3 (citing Planned Parenthood of
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th
Cir. 2002) (en banc)).
49. Id. at 624 (citing United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 831-32 (10th Cir.
1986)).
50. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
51. Id. at 309.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 309-10.
54. Id. at 310.
7
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insult, 55 a face-to-face utterance, 56 has a direct tendency to cause immediate
57 58violence57 and is directed at an individual or discernable group.
While the United States Supreme Court permits fighting words to be
proscribed, courts have been reluctant to silence speech that is merely
offensive.59 Both the context and location of offensive speech factor into the
determination of whether the potentially offensive speech can be proscribed.60
Highlighting this point, many courts allow speech that pervades one's home
to be more readily proscribed than speech that occurs out in public because
the home is a sanctuary for its owner.61 In turn, individuals within their
homes are considered captive audiences and cannot avert their ears as they
could in a public place.62  However, some courts have extended this
heightened right to places beyond the home.63 Therefore, it is important to
determine the boundaries a court might set in regards to electronic
communications and captive audiences.
3. Anonymous Speech and the Internet
The Internet may have an effect on how anonymous speech is regulated.
While the internet provides a vast forum for people to communicate their
views, it is also easy to harass, annoy, and engender fear anonymously. 64
Several United States Supreme Court decisions have commented on a right to
anonymous speech. The leading case, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, set forth two reasons for protecting anonymous speech: (1)
anonymity encourages some authors who may be reluctant to enter the
marketplace of ideas to do so without fear of retaliation, and (2) an "author
generally is free to decide whether or not to disclose his or her true
identity."
65
55. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
56. See id. at 573.
57. See, e.g., id.
58. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
59. See id at 21 ("[T]he mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or
viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving
offense."); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) ("[W]e expect
individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear ... ").
60. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 n.27
(1978); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
61. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S.
728, 738 (1970)).
62. Id.
63. E.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000) (stating that an individual's
choice to reject unwanted speech is also available in "confrontational settings").
64. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1537, 1556, 1558 (2007).
65. 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995).
[Vol. 74
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While anonymous speech was traditionally protected, with the ease of
anonymous harassment on the Internet, it is important to determine when it
can be regulated. Because this is an emerging issue and one that is distinct
from traditional forms of communication, the United States Supreme Court
has not provided a solid approach to this issue.66 Lower courts, therefore,
will likely continue to hold that anonymous speech on the Internet should
only be protected if it does not fall into a category outside the protections of
the First Amendment, such as true threats or fighting words.
67
4. Vagueness and Substantial Overbreadth
Many legislatures, including Missouri's, have enacted statutes that
criminalize cyberbullying. In formulating these criminal laws, constitutional
due process requires that the laws be sufficiently clear so that a "'person of
ordinary intelligence [is given] a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.' 68 If a statute fails this standard,
the law is void-for-vagueness. 69 Further, in determining if a law is void, a
court "looks at what a person of 'common intelligence' would 'reasonably'
understand the statute to proscribe, not what the particular defendant
understood the statute to mean.",70 This objective inquiry is undertaken in
order to prevent law enforcement from making "arbitrary and discriminatory"
decisions in enforcing laws in order to satisfy their own interest. 71 Thus, it is
essential to determine if new cyberbullying laws give potential cyberbullies
sufficient notice of the criminal nature of their behavior as determined by an
objective standard.
In addition to the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the Supreme Court also
requires that laws not be substantially overbroad.72 Under this doctrine, a law
is invalid if it limits a substantial amount of protected speech whether in the
current case or in future applications. 73 In other words, the court must
determine "'whether a government restriction of speech that is arguably valid
66. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 64, at 1538.
67. Eugene Volokh, Annoying Anonymous Speech Online, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY, Jan. 10, 2006, http://volokh.com/posts/1l36923654.shtml.
68. United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
69. Id. at 929.
70. Id. at 930 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29,
32-33 (1963)).
71. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) ("Where the legislature fails
to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit 'a standardless
sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections."' (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575
(1974))).
72. Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 800 (1984).
73. Id. at 800 n.19.
9
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as applied to the case at hand should nevertheless be invalidated to avoid the
substantial prospect of unconstitutional application elsewhere."' 74  When
challenging a statute as overbroad, the plaintiff is not limited to arguing the
personal harms he or she has suffered but may also argue the rights of third
parties are being impinged upon by the law. 75 However, for the challenging
party to succeed in this third-party argument, there must be a "realistic danger
that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court. 76  In order to
prevent unnecessary restriction on speech, newly enacted statutes
criminalizing cyberbullying should be narrowly tailored.
Due to the emergence of cyberbullying, and its ability to cause serious
injury, Missouri amended its harassment statutes to include electronic
communications. However, since state boundaries do not limit the Internet,
federal anti-harassment statutes may also be necessary to sufficiently curb the
problem. Additionally, statutes that prohibit the behavior of cyberbullies must
comport with the aforementioned constitutional requirements.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Missouri Revised Statute § 565.090
In November of 2007, then-Missouri Governor Matt Blunt created an
"Internet Harassment Task Force" to strengthen the state's harassment and
stalking statutes to include Internet communications. 77 The task force helped
78draft Senate Bills 818 and 795. Senator Scott Rupp, the bill's sponsor, said
that "[w]e want to make it very clear that people who pursue, harass, or
contact people in these unsolicited ways are going to be held accountable for
their heinous actions. 79 On June 1, 2008, Missouri Governor Matt Blunt
signed into law Senate Bill 795, which went into effect August 28, 2008.80
Within the bill, existing Missouri Revised Statute § 565.090 was rewritten to
74. Id. (quoting John Calvin Jeffries Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J.
409, 425 (1983)).
75. L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 (1999).
76. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801 (citing Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975)).
77. Press Release, Matt Blunt, Governor of Mo., Gov. Blunt Enacts Legislation




80. Act to Repeal Sections 160.261, 565.090, and 565.225, RSMo, and to Enact
in Lieu Thereof Three New Sections Relating to Crimes of Harassment, with Penalty
Provisions, 2008 Mo. Laws 812; see also Elizabeth Perry, Blunt Signs Cyberbulling
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cover instances of harassment by "electronic communication."81  Then-
Governor Blunt said that "[t]his new law will ensure that we have the
protections and penalties needed to safeguard Missourians from Internet
harassment."
82
In adopting the new law, many adjustments were made to Missouri
Revised Statute § 565.090 to make it an effective tool in preventing online
bullying. For example, instead of limiting harassing contact to writing and by
telephone, the statute now uses broader language such as "when
communicating," "any electronic communication," and "communicates."
83
Further, the bill extended the potential ways to commit the crime of
harassment from four to six. 84 The first section of the amended statute kept a
"true threat" clause, but adds a mens rea element by stating that a person is in
violation of the statute if he or she "'[k]nowingly communicates a threat to
commit any felony to another person." 5 Also, a harm requirement was added
by requiring that the threat must "frighten[], intimidate[], or cause[]
emotional distress" to the victim.86  This provision mirrors what would
constitute a true threat as defined by the United States Supreme Court and
would therefore likely survive a constitutional inquiry on this ground. 87 What
remains to be seen are the limits this law will have as it pertains to
punishment of cyberbullying.
Next, the legislature altered the second provision of paragraph one of §
565.090. This provision applies when a person "uses coarse language
offensive to one of average sensibility and thereby puts such person in
reasonable apprehension of offensive physical contact or harm." 88 This is the
same standard as used for "fighting words." 89 In order for "fighting words"
to be proscribed, courts must first determine when an online communication
puts someone in a position to fear violence. 90 If the communication places an
individual in such a position, it can then be limited or punished.91 Thus, the
81. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090.1(3) (Supp. 2008); see Press Release, supra
note 77.
82. Press Release, supra note 77.
83. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.090.1(2)-(4).
84. Id. § 565.090.1(1)-(6).
85. Id. § 565.090.1(1) (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. See supra Part II.C.1.
88. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.090.1(2).
89. See supra Part II.C.2.
90. See supra Part II.C.2.
91. See supra Part II.C.2. It bears noting again that courts are hesitant to censure
or limit speech that is merely offensive. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
Further, "the exception for fighting words requires a certain immediacy, which is not
present with regard to media violence." Abby L. Schloessman Risner, Comment,
Violence, Minors and the First Amendment: What Is Unprotected Speech and What
Should Be?, 24 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 243, 251 (2005).
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effectiveness of this provision turns not on the provision itself, but on the
facts applied to it.
The bill's third provision prohibits anonymous contact, as it did before
the statute was amended, but now includes contact made by "electronic
communication. ' '92 This provision also requires mens rea for harm, similar to
the first provision. 93 The effectiveness of the cyberbullying statute hinges on
this third factor because of the assumption that anonymous speech can be
proscribed only if it falls into a regulated category. 94 Since this provision
requires someone to "knowingly frighten[], intimidate[], or cause[] emotional
distress" it incorporates "true threat" or "fighting words" standards and would
likely survive constitutional challenges. 95
The fourth provision is a new addition to the statute.96 The main
purpose of this provision is to require "reckless" intent instead of actual
knowledge in certain circumstances. 97 The provision applies, and therefore
recklessness is required as it pertains to harm, only if the harasser
"[k]nowingly communicates with another person who is, or who purports to
be, seventeen years of age or younger.' 98 The lower reckless standard does
not apply if the victim is over the age of seventeen. This provision could be
constitutionally justified by proving that the government has a compelling
interest in protecting children from harmful speech due to children's
impressionable minds. 99 However, the United States Supreme Court has not
clearly articulated the principle underlying this interest or whether it applies
to more than just violent and sexually explicit speech. °00 Even so, the
overwhelming interest of shielding minors from harm makes it likely that
protecting children from reckless intimidation or emotional distress is
constitutional.
92. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.090.1(3) ("Knowingly frightens, intimidates, or causes
emotional distress to another person by anonymously making a telephone call or any
electronic communication....").
93. Id.
94. Lee Tien, Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet,
75 OR. L. REv. 117, 123 (1996) ("Because a substantial amount of expressive activity
on the Internet is associational, any broad regulation of anonymity on the Internet is
likely to be unconstitutional.").
95. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090.1(3).
96. See Mo. REV. STAT. §.565.090.1(4).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) ("The State also has an
independent interest in the well-being of its youth."). "Even the Court's staunchest
defenders of First Amendment rights have often adopted this position." Alan E.
Garfield, Protecting Children from Speech, 57 FLA. L. REv. 565, 594 (2005) (citing
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 513 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
100. See Garfield, supra note 99, at 594 ("Even Ginsberg v. New York, the
Court's seminal decision upholding child-protection censorship, offers only a
superficial explanation for why the censorship is allowed.").
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The fifth provision of the amended statute adds an intent requirement,
but it is a stricter requirement than what is required in the fourth provision.' 
01
The term "unwanted" is added as well. 102 In full, the section states that one
"commits the crime of harassment if he or she . . . [k]nowingly makes
repeated unwanted communication to another person."'  The United States
Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutional validity of statutes that
prohibit persons from continuing unwanted communication. 104 These statutes
are validated because there is a compelling government interest in protecting
people from harassing contact. 0 5 The addition of the term "unwanted" to this
provision resurrects the question of whether the harassment begins only after
the harasser has been told to stop.'06
The sixth and final element of the first paragraph of the statute is a
catch-all provision based on the language "engages in any other act."'0 7 Also,
this last provision provides that "such person's response to the act is one of a
person of average sensibilities considering the age of such person,' 0 8 which
seems to advocate a type of "reasonable recipient approach."' 0 9  The
inclusion of this phrase indicates that in applying this catch-all provision, a
court must look at what the speaker foresaw the reaction of the victim to
be." 0
In light of these six provisions and with this statutory construction,
several potential challenges could be raised against the validity of this statute.
First, the general language of the statute, "purpose to frighten, intimidate, or
cause emotional distress," may be constitutionally vague."' However, State
v. Koetting held that "[t]he terms 'purpose,' [and] 'frighten' ... are words of
common usage and definition and a person of ordinary intelligence would
know by reading the statute that if he acts with the purpose of upsetting
101. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090.1(5).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970).
105. Id.
106. See infra Part IV.
107. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090.1(6). The second paragraph of § 565.090
increases the crime to a class D felony if the perpetrator is at least twenty-one and the
victim is seventeen or younger. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090.2(1). Further, it makes
this crime a class D felony for repeat offenders of this law or any jurisdiction's law
similar to it. Id. § 565.090.2(2). Finally, the third paragraph waives the statute for
"law enforcement officers conducting investigations." Id. § 565.090.3.
108. Id. § 565.090.1(6).
109. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
111. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090.1(6); see also State v. Koetting, 616 S.W.2d
822, 824 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (stating this argument as one of the defendant's
unsuccessful points on appeal).
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another, he subjects himself to criminal liability."" 2 The Koetting court also
held that the part of the provision that forces an actor to consider the reaction
of an individual with "average sensibility" was not vague. 1 3 In doing so, it
said courts should take a totality of the circumstances approach and
"[e]xamine[] th[e] language in light of the conduct with which [a person] [is]
charged.""
The language "purpose to frighten, intimidate, or cause emotional
distress"" 5 also gives rise to an argument that the provision is substantially
overbroad.ll6 Koetting held, however, that "[b]ecause the statute applies only
to protect the privacy of persons within their own homes, the statute is not
overbroad."' ' 7 In light of the fact that this statute now applies to a broader
channel of communication (the Internet) than it did before, the overbreadth
argument may be resurrected in order to determine whether a person's online
profile page or e-mail is as private as his or her home telephone line.
118
Prior to this statute's amendment, Missouri law did not punish
cyberbullying. The bare bones Missouri Revised Statute § 565.095 limited
harassment to telephones and writing." 19 However, after Senate Bill 795
passed, the section now amply protects Missourians, especially minors, from120
online harassment. Still, Missouri courts resolved several constitutional
challenges to the statute before its recent amendments. Therefore, it is likely
112. Koetting, 616 S.W.2d at 825. In this case the court was analyzing a
constitutional challenge to the Missouri harassment statute before its most recent
amendments. Id. at 823. That statute read as follows:
1. A person commits the crime of harassment if for the purpose of
frightening or disturbing another person, he
(1) Communicates in writing or by telephone a threat to commit any
felony; or
(2) Makes a telephone call or communicates in writing and uses
coarse language offensive to one of average sensibility; or
(3) Makes a telephone call anonymously; or
(4) Makes repeated telephone calls.
2. Harassment is a class A misdemeanor.
Id. at 824 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090 (1978) (amended 2008)).
113. Id. at 826 (construing §565.090.1(2)).
114. Id.
115. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090.1(6).
116. See Koetting, 616 S.W.2d at 826.
117. Id. at 827.
118. See infra Part IV.
119. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090 (2000), amended by Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090
(Supp. 2008).
120. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090.1(4) (Supp. 2008) ("A person commits the crime
of harassment if he or she... [k]nowingly communicates with another person who is,
or who purports to be, seventeen years of age or younger and in so doing and without
good cause recklessly frightens, intimidates, or causes emotional distress to such other
person.... ."); see also Press Release, supra note 77.
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new challenges will arise and need to be addressed in order to determine the
validity of the revisions.
B. Cyberbullying as a Federal Crime
Despite her egregious actions, Missouri officials were unable to charge
Lori Drew with a crime. 12 However, after creatively interpreting the federal
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 122 federal officials charged her with
conspiracy and unauthorized access of a computer. 2 3 In other words, they
charged her for "criminally trespass[ing] onto MySpace . . . in a way that
violated MySpace's Terms of Service (TOS).' 2 4 The three essential points
of this particular TOS were: 1) provide accurate registration information; 2)
do not promote abusive conduct; and 3) do not harass or harm other people. 125
Drew's actions would have been a felony if the government proved that she
violated the MySpace TOS to further a criminal or tortious act. 12  In this
case, the criminal or tortious act would be the intentional infliction of
emotional distress on Megan, with the suicide as proof. 127 However, if jurors
did not think that Drew accessed the MySpace website to inflict emotional
distress or mentally disturb Megan, the jurors could find Drew guilt8 of a
misdemeanor charge of unauthorized access to a protected computer. On
121. Deirdre Shesgreen, HulshofMoves to Criminalize Cyberbullying, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH., May 23, 2008, at A2, available at http://www.stltoday.com/
stltoday/news/stories.nsf/washington/story/BC8E1292B I26AC3386257452000CDF9
6?OpenDocument.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
123. Shesgreen, supra note 121.
124. Orin Kerr, The MySpace Suicide Indictment - And Why It Should Be
Dismissed, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, May 15, 2008, http://volokh.com/posts/
1210889188.shtml.
125. See MySpace.com, Terms of Use Agreement §§ 1, 7.1, 8.2 (June 15, 2006),
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfn?fuseaction-misc.terms (last visited Mar. 25,
2009). Since the servers for MySpace are located in California, prosecutors were
given jurisdiction there. In turn, that is where Lori Drew faced trial. Kerr, supra note
124.
126. Kerr, supra note 124.
127. Robert Patrick & David Hunn, Lori Drew Cyber-bullying Case Reach Trial,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 18, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.stltoday
.coml/stltoday/news/stories.nsf/stlouiscitycounty/story/B80D079D8AD6ADI 5862575
05001283E4?OpenDocument. The trial began on November 18, 2008. Id. A week
before it began in California, U.S. District Court Judge George Wu decided that the
jury would hear evidence of Megan's suicide. Id. He made this decision because,
otherwise, it would be difficult for the jurors to understand how there was an element
of emotional distress. Id. Additionally, the standard of proving such an element is
lowered if the actor "knows the victim is vulnerable, or if the two are in a relationship
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November 26, 2008, the jury took exactly that route, and convicted Lori
Drew of three misdemeanor charges of computer fraud. 129 In other words, the
jury did not think Drew meant to inflict emotional distress on Megan Meier.
Lori Drew's trial and verdict raise the issue of whether prosecution of
cyberbullies would be more effective under a new proposed federal law or
under the existing Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The new proposed
federal law is the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act 130 and was
introduced in the aftermath of Megan Meier's suicide in an attempt to
explicitly make cyberbullying a federal crime.' 3 1 In short, the new section to
Chapter 41 of Title 18, United States Code, punishes electronic
communications when the communicator has "inten[t] to coerce, intimidate,
harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to [a] person."' 3 2  This
language is strikingly similar to the language in the amended Missouri
harassment statute133 and, therefore, the proposed legislation will likely pass
constitutional muster. 134 However, this bill has yet to be voted on by the
House and Senate, and it was referred to the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security on July 28, 2008.'
The recent developments in Missouri's harassment law give insight into
how state legislatures are attacking the problem of cyberbullying. However,
current federal laws do not give federal prosecutors sufficient tools to enable
them to punish cyberbullies for the emotional harm such actors cause. Also,
a law that provides federal prosecutors with the tools to take such action
would ensure that cyberbullies who send messages across state lines cannot
escape punishment simply because of gaps in state law. The following
discussion examines these issues and will show how Missouri courts are
going to have to revisit challenges to the constitutional validity of § 565.090.
129. Jennifer Steinhauer, Verdict in MySpace Suicide Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26,
2008, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/us/27myspace.html?_
r= l. The jury was deadlocked on the conspiracy charge, and a mistrial was declared
on that charge. Id. Also, this conviction is currently under review by the judge, and if
it is upheld, defense counsel will be appealing to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Orin Kerr, Wat Does the Lori Drew Verdict Mean?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY,
Nov. 26, 2008, http://volokh.com/posts/1227728513.shtml. It should be noted that
Orin Kerr was on Lori Drew's legal team for this trial. Id.
130. H.R. 6123, 110th Cong. (2008).
131. OpenCongress, H.R. 6123, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/I 10-
h6123/show (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
132. Id.
133. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090.1(6) (Supp. 2008).
134. Refer to supra Part II.A of this law summary for a discussion of the
Missouri statute's constitutional validity.
135. OpenCongress, supra note 131 (click on "Show All Actions").
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IV. DISCUSSION
In overhauling state law, the Missouri legislature ensured that
cyberbullies will have to face prosecution for harassment under § 565.090.
More importantly, Missouri Senate Bill 795 modernizes the protection
afforded to the state's citizens. This update was necessary because the
Internet is now used as a major means of communication, especially among
minors.
While the new Missouri law is a step in the right direction, what remains
to be seen is how far courts will extend the criminalization of cyberbullying.
In order to determine the limits of this new law, courts will have to determine
how captive one is to communications made online. The context and location
of offensive speech is important in determining if it can be proscribed.
Obviously, much of the reason words written online are so damaging is that
they are permanent and visible to third-parties. On the other hand,
communications by cyberullies are fairly easy to ignore in some instances
because of certain features that come with most interactive websites and
instant messengers. These features include blocking certain individuals from
contacting another person or even seeing one's online profile. In addition,
depending on the online website, an individual can restrict access to his or her
profile page or friends list or limit who can write publicly on his or her page.
Despite the fact that individuals choose to go online and are afforded options
to protect their privacy, courts may have to turn to whether the victim was
really "captive" to the harmful communication.
1 36
While limiting one's online availability by blocking unknown users,
preventing strangers from writing on one's wall, and other provided tools,
cyberbullies are constantly evolving and developing new tactics to torment
their victims.137 Outside of a victim's website or page, cyberbullies can still
write online about their victim, whether on a separate webpage or on the
cyberbully's own profile.' 38  While this type of harassment may be
punishable under the amended Missouri statute, 139 critics argue that the
amended harassment statutes are too restrictive. 14  In other words, these
critics think that going beyond the one-on-one idea of the old telephone
harassment statutes violates the First Amendment because "in a one-to-many
136. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988). In other words, the
court will have to determine whether the communication is inherently offensive and
intrusive. Id. at 486.
137. Make a Difference for Kids, Cyberbullying: Common Cyberbullying Tactics,
http://www.makeadifferenceforkids.org/cyberbullying.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2009).
138. Id.
139. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090.1(6).
140. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace from the Listener's
Perspective: Private Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harassment, and Sex,
1996 U. CI-. LEGAL F. 377, 414.
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context, a message that's annoying, even intentionally so, to one person may
indeed be valuable to others."' However, the solution to this criticism, as it
pertains to § 565.090, is that the Missouri statute does not use language such
as "annoy" in constructing the statute. 142 Instead, the statute restricts itself to
previously reulated speech using words such as "frighten," "threat," and
"intimidate."' 1 3 Regardless, courts will eventually have to clear this matter of
terminology.
Critics of a statute that criminally punishes speech that takes place at a
"third-party" webpage may be swayed by analyzing certain websites where
cyberbullying is rampant. For instance, thedirty.com is a website that allows
people to send in pictures of others. 144  Once a picture is posted, the
webmaster makes a demeaning comment and then allows others to comment
as well. Typically these comments are rude, insulting, and anonymous. One
post reads as follows: "[Jane] is a nasty slut and has no reason to brag about
herself when she's disgusting and fat. She has no teeth and fried hair."'
145
This post is one of many in regards to the corresponding picture, and is far
less vulgar than some of the others. 146  Are these comments criminal
cyberbullying? It is likely that this and the other communications under this
picture would cause a reasonableperson to be "frighten[ed], intimidat[ed], or
,,1W
emotional[ly] distress[ed]. Further, most of the comments under this
picture are anonymous. Also, someone made a comment that the girl
everyone was talking about was a minor. 148 A court might hold that this
constitutes knowledge that the victim is a minor, thereby making it a felony.
A person making the demeaning comments might argue that he or she had no
reason to believe she was truly a minor. Regardless, it seems clear that this
example is at least a misdemeanor violation of the new law. However, it will
take actual charges and prosecution to determine what type of speech
141. Id. (contending that the word "annoy" can be overbroad in applying the
statute to new age technology).
142. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090.
143. Id.
144. The Dirty, http://www.thedirty.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). The website
is organized by cities and colleges, including some in Missouri. Once you go to an
area's link, it has page after page of pictures that were sent to the website by random
people who may or may not know the individuals in those pictures. However, due to
the direct language accompanied by each picture, it seems most of those who submit
the pictures know the people in them.
145. Id. I have chosen not to cite the exact post where this language comes from
in order to prevent the further exposure of this victim. In addition, I have altered the
name used in the comment.
146. Id. The main comment under the picture of the victim is so vulgar I have
chosen not to include it in this article. However, by visiting the website one can find
language similar and worse under other pictures with minimal effort.
147. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090.1(4).
148. See The Dirty, supra note 144.
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Missouri is ready to proscribe. 149 When these criminal charges do happen,
the location of the speech may also be a decisive factor in court.
One of the few current laws to prosecute cyberbullying on the federal
level, as evidenced by the Lori Drew indictment15 and her trial, is 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030. To have a stronger chance at conviction, a law more tailored to
cyberbullying is required. The proposed Megan Meier Cyberbullying
Prevention Act is such a law. This proposed law will prevent federal
prosecutors from convoluting other laws, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1030, in an
attempt to criminalize behavior that is not the cause of the victim's
suffering. 51  Generally, the cause of the harm is the actual harassing
communications written online by the cyberbully which are directed at or
concern the victim.'
52
Beyond the need for a law that punishes cyberbullies for the emotional
harm they cause, a federal law is necessary to prevent jurisdictional
challenges that hinder prosecution.153 Because the Internet crosses state lines
and international borders, jurisdictional problems are bound to arise.
149. It would be efficient for law enforcement if website operators track the IP
addresses of the anonymous perpetrators so that those individuals can be easily
identified. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 117 (2009).
However, if the website does not do this, the persons could still be identified within
sixty days of the communication by the ISP addresses. Id. at 118. If this does not
work, it leads to a deeper discussion of whether the website operator should be held
liable or criminally responsible for a third-party's communications. For such a
discussion see id. at 117-25.
150. Indictment at 9, United States v. Drew, No. CR, (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2008),
http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2008/images/05/15/my.space.drew.indictment.pdf (last
visited Mar. 25, 2009).
151. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and
"Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1599 (2003).
"Because Internet users routinely ignore the legalese that they encounter in contracts
governing the use of websites... broad judicial interpretations of unauthorized access
statutes could potentially make millions of Americans criminally liable for the way
they send e-mails and surf the Web." Id. Therefore, a cyberbully's act of violating
the terms of service is what is criminal and not the actual communications which are
harmful to the victim. See id. at 1598-99.
152. See generally Robin M. Kowalski, Cyber Bullying, PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/article/10168/
1336550?pageNumber=2 (discussing the harmful effects of cyberbullying and how to
treat victims). The article also states that cyberbullying results in increased absences
and lower grades in school. Id. Senate Bill 818 & 795 also addressed this issue by
amending Mo. REV. STAT. § 160.261. Act to Repeal Sections 160.261, 565.090, and
565.225, RSMo, and to Enact in Lieu Thereof Three New Sections Relating to Crimes
of Harassment, with Penalty Provisions, 2008 Mo. Laws 812. However, a discussion
of this statute is outside the scope of this law summary. For a discussion of such
issues see Renee L. Servance, Comment, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the
Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 1213.
153. See Goodno, supra note 19, at 129.
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Therefore, in some cases, no single state could prosecute an interstate
message. For instance, imagine if a cyberbully were in a state that does not
criminalize cyberbullying but sends a message to a child in Missouri, a state
that does criminalize cyberbullying. This would create a conflict as to
whether the laws of the sender's state or the victim's state apply. 54 Without
a uniform federal law on the issue, state officials are burdened with the task
of prosecuting cyberbullying cases "because it may require collecting
evidence from many jurisdictions."' 55
Now that Missouri prosecutors are able to charge those that harass
others through electronic means, cyberbullies may think twice before
engaging in injurious communication in this state. It seems inevitable,
however, that the newly amended statute will be challenged on First
Amendment grounds. When this happens, a court will have to determine if §
565.090 retained its pre-amendment constitutional validity.1 56 Beyond the
scope of Missouri's laws, proposed federal legislation would solve current
weaknesses in federal law and prevent criminals from escaping prosecution
due to conflicts in state law or lack of state resources.
V. CONCLUSION
With the passage of Senate Bills 818 and 795, Missouri took a giant leap
forward in protecting individuals, especially minors, from the new form of
harassment known as cyberbullying. However, it is likely that when a
cyberbully is prosecuted under the provisions of this statute, its constitutional
validity will be challenged. When that happens, hopefully the court will
clarify or reaffirm the amendments so that their validity and reach become
clear. Also, with the enactment of federal laws, cyberbullies can be
prosecuted easier when their actions take place across state lines. Therefore,
it is important that the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Protection Act pass and
become federal law. Finally, while the statute now in place was too late to
prevent the suicide of Megan Meier, hopefully it can deter any similar tragic
event. Cyberbullies have now been clearly warned that when they prey upon
others online their actions will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.
ANDREW M. HENDERSON
154. Id.
155. Id. at 130 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING:
A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INDUSTRY (1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm).
156. See supra Part I.B.
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